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Abstract 
We study the determinants of corporate CDS spreads for 125 companies headquartered 
in the Eurozone, with an emphasis on sovereign CDS spreads as a main determinant of 
corporate CDS spreads in levels and changes. This is done by analyzing financial 
companies, as well as non-financial companies. The period of analysis is from January 
2004 to April 2014, which has been divided into 3 sub-periods; before, during, and after 
the global financial crisis. We found evidence of a spillover effect in credit risk from 
private-to-public during the global financial crisis, and public-to-private after the crisis, 
mainly with the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis. The effect of sovereign-to-
corporate credit risk spillover is more pronounced for companies headquartered in 
GIIPS countries and non-financial companies, especially after the global financial crisis. 
Keywords: CDS determinants, spillover effect, corporate credit risk, sovereign credit 
risk, credit default swaps, Eurozone. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
With the onset of the global financial crisis, credit markets have been subject to 
extraordinary reprising of credit risk. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 
2008 pushed financial institutions into massive losses, causing damaged investor 
confidence in the financial system.                                    
The aftermath of the financial crisis resulted in governmental intervention in 
the form of bailouts and fiscal stimulus, which tremendously increased public sector 
deficit and sovereign debt levels. This unprecedented increase in sovereign debt levels 
increased the default risk of sovereigns, making a default of a developed sovereign real 
for the first time. Shifting risk from the financial sector to the sovereign, led 
governments into financial distress and shifted the debt burden from sovereign to 
corporate again. During the global financial crisis and the following European sovereign 
debt crisis between 2007 and 2012, the credit spreads (CDS spreads) of corporates and 
financials experienced a lot of fluctuation. The CDS index (Figure 1), which represents 
the overall development of the corporate credit market in Europe, increased between 
the years 2007 and 2008, from a stable level of 50 bps, to around 200 bps. In the 
following two years, due to governmental and central bank intervention, the level of 
corporate CDS spreads stabilized at around 100 bps.                                        
 In May 2010 the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone intensified, which caused 
a widening of corporate CDS spreads to approximately 200 bps once again. European 
central bank interventions and announcements by Mario Draghi in the summer of 
2012, calmed down the economic turmoil in the Eurozone and yet again stabilized the 
corporate CDS spreads at approximately 75 bps. For the companies located within the 
struggling Eurozone countries, GIIPS1, the widening of the corporate CDS spreads was 
more pronounced compared to non-struggling companies headquartered in CORE2 
countries in the Eurozone. As Bedendo and Colla (2013) show, there are signs of a 
spillover effect from sovereign credit risk to corporate credit risk in the Eurozone, 
                                                           
1 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain 
2 Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
9 
 
which previous research by (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taskler (2003), 
Tang and Yan (2008) and Darwin et al. (2012)) have overlooked as a possible 
determinant of corporate credit risk. 
1.2. Problem discussion 
Motivated by the aforementioned development; this paper will focus on the 
analysis of the determinants of corporate CDS spreads in levels, as well as changes, with 
a focus on the spillover effect from sovereign to corporate credit risk as an additional 
explanatory variable for corporate CDS spreads in the Eurozone. The reason for our 
interest in the spillover effect as a determinant of corporate CDS spreads, lays in the fact 
that previous research has overlooked the sovereign credit risk as a potential 
determinant of corporate CDS spreads in the Eurozone. Typically, the effect of 
sovereign credit risk on the corporate sector has been investigated for emerging 
markets. This paper aims to find evidence of this relationship for developed economies, 
specifically the Eurozone countries. 
 In line with previous research on credit risk (Longstaff et al. (2005), Pan and 
Singelton (2008)), CDS spreads are the price of credit risk and can therefore be used as a 
proxy for measuring the corporate credit spread. These credit derivatives, which are 
traded in the Over-The-Counter (OTC) market and therefore provide us with daily 
market prices ensuring ample liquidity, have been developed to provide corporations 
and investors a relatively easy vehicle to transfer credit risk. The choice of CDS spread 
as a dependent variable, is undermined by the fact that in frictionless markets the 
spread of the corporate bond should be equal to the CDS spread for the same underlying 
entity due to arbitrage forces (Beinstein and Scott (2006), Fontana and Scheicher ( 
2010)).           
 In addition, we examine if the determinants of corporate CDS spreads have 
changed before, during, and after the global financial crisis. This is analyzed from 
January 2004 to April 2014 by dividing our entire sample into three sub-periods in 
order to identify changes in drivers of corporate CDS spreads between the sub-periods. 
The first sub-period is from January 2004 to April 2008, which coincides with the time 
before the first significant increase in corporate CDS spreads. The second sub-period 
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covers the period from May 2008 to April 2010; this period is characterized as the peak 
of the global financial crisis following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Lastly, the 
third sub-period is between May 2010 and April 2014, which includes the impact of the 
European sovereign debt crisis. Further, we divide our dataset consisting of 125 
companies headquartered in the Eurozone into financials and non-financials, GIIPS and 
CORE, and sectors3, in order to identify if there are common factors affecting corporate 
CDS spreads or if they differ depending on the categories denoted.  
 The analysis of the determinants is based on the theoretical arguments used in 
the structural credit risk model by Merton (1974), and extended by several global 
market-factors including our main contribution to existing literature in adding the 
sovereign CDS spread as an additional explanatory variable of the corporate CDS 
spreads. Before analyzing the determinants of corporate CDS spreads in levels and 
changes, we test for common factors in order to identify the nature of the 
communalities in corporate CDS spreads.       
 This paper will help investors, practitioners as well as academic researchers, 
understand the most recent determinants of credit spreads, which is important when 
investing in fixed income securities with an inherent credit risk. 
1.3. Purpose 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze determinants of corporate CDS 
spreads in the Eurozone before, during, and after the global financial crisis.   
 In addressing the main purpose, the analysis is centered around two main points. 
Firstly, the determinants of corporate CDS spreads are identified to see whether the 
determinants have changed between the three sub-periods. Secondly, the main focus, 
which lies on the risk transfer between the sovereign and corporate sector, i.e. whether 
there is spillover from the sovereign to corporate credit risk, and whether the 
magnitude of this spillover has changed over time and across our defined panels4.  
                                                           
3 Auto & Industrials, Consumer, Energy, Financial services and TMT. The selection of the sectors is based 
on sub-indicies of the iTraxx Europe 125 index. 
4 Panel A: All 125 companis, Panel B: Non-financials, Panel C: Financials, Panel D: CORE, Panel E: 
GIIPS, Panel F: Auto & Industrials, Panel G: Consumer, Panel H: Energy, Panel I: Financial services and 
Panel J: TMT (see appendix Table 9-28). 
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1.4. Outline 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the structure of 
CDS contracts, followed by the description of the Merton (1974) model that serves as a 
starting point for our choice of theoretical determinants of corporate CDS spreads. 
Additionally, we also present previous literature and introduce the theoretical 
framework for the spillover effect. 
 
Section 3 describes the data and introduces the main variables as well as the 
methodology for the empirical investigation.  
 
Section 4 presents the analysis of our main empirical results for the different panels, 
including principal component analysis and Granger’s causality test. 
 
Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses limitations of the analysis, as well as further 
research implications. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. Credit Default Swaps 
Credit spread is defined as the difference between the yield of the risky security 
and the risk-free rate, where both have identical time to maturity. A financial 
instrument that is widely used as a proxy; as a measure of the credit spread and that has 
been used extensively after the financial crisis and received considerable attention; is 
the credit default swap (CDS). The CDS works as a measure of pure credit risk Longstaff 
et al. (2005). The CDS can be interpreted as an insurance premium for protection 
against the credit risk exposure, often referred to as the CDS spread (Ericsson et al., 
2009). A CDS contract provides a safety net for the exerciser, acting as an insurance 
against the exposure to credit risk. The CDS transfers the credit risk from the buyer to 
the seller, however in exchange, the buyer must make regular payment to the insurer 
(the seller). In case of default, the buyer is fully compensated by receiving the 
difference of the initial amount of the loan and its recovery value from the seller 
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(insurer).           
 CDS’s are widely used as hedging instruments as they separate interest rate and 
currency risk from the credit risk, enabling the holder of the contract to hedge his 
credit risk exposure without selling the loan or the bond (Naifar and Abid, 2005). In this 
thesis, we use CDS spreads as a measure of credit risk. The major advantage of using 
CDS spreads instead of bond spreads, is that they provide a more accurate measure of 
the credit risk of the issuer (see Pan and Singleton (2008), Longstaff et al. (2005), and 
Longstaff et al. (2011)). The findings of the latter studies proves that bond spreads are 
determined by multiple factors, one being the liquidity premium, which plays a vital 
role. Since sovereign and corporate bonds are traded on the secondary market, 
illiquidity is not of concern; this ensures similar liquidity for both the sovereign and 
corporate CDS as we use the 5-year CDS spread, which has the most liquid maturity. 
This is also in line with previous research by (Longstaff et al. (2011), Pan and Singleton 
(2008), and Archarya et al. (2011)), who also made use of CDS spreads as a measure of 
credit risk. This, in accordance with previous research, shows that CDS spreads are a 
more accurate measure of the issuer’s creditworthiness.      
 A shift in creditworthiness could erupt into financial difficulties if a negative 
development in a country’s or company’s creditworthiness was to cause an increase in 
probability of default, or decrease in distance to default, it would result in an increase in 
the credit spread and CDS spread, respectively. The opposite is true if a country or 
company experiences a positive development in their creditworthiness. Under these 
conditions, they would enjoy a decrease in their probability of default, causing an 
increase in distance to default and a decrease in the credit spread (Merton, 1974). 
2.2. Credit Risk Models 
Researchers such as Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Ericsson et al. (2009), Black 
and Cox (1976), and Bryis and De Varenne (1997) have based their respective studies’ 
on the structural credit risk model by Merton (1974) when examining how changes in 
firm-specifics affect the probability of default and hence, the CDS spread. The Merton 
model is referred to as the structural credit risk model due to its dependence on the 
structural characteristics of the borrowing firms; leverage (financial risk); volatility of 
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total assets (business risk); and the value of total assets. As an interruption in 
creditworthiness occurs for a country or entity, there will be a change in the probability 
of default. This in turn affects the distance of default, which finally affects the credit 
spread, and its equivalent CDS spread of the country or entity (Hull et al., 2004).  
 Further, the intuition behind the Merton model is based on the principles of 
option pricing developed by Black-Scholes (1973). However, the interruption in 
creditworthiness only occurs when the value of the company’s assets is lower than the 
nominal value of debt at maturity of the debt. Consequently, the company will no 
longer be able to uphold its contractual obligations towards its debt holders. The 
Merton (1974) model used as a starting point in Bryis and de Varenne’s (1997) study 
investigates the event of default. They argue that the advantage of using structural 
models is that it provides an economic intuition behind the event of default.  
 Previous research based on the characteristics of the structural model by Merton 
(1974), investigates factors affecting CDS spreads. Darwin et al. (2012) include both 
firm-specific variables (such as leverage and market-to-book) and macroeconomic 
variables (the slope of the yield curve, time to maturity of the underlying bond etc), 
which shows that a number of these variables, in many cases, are significant 
determinants of credit spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) found a relatively low 
explanatory power in explaining the variation of the model with an adjusted R-squared 
of 25%. In order to better understand the nature of the remaining variation, they 
applied a principal component analysis on the residuals and found that common 
systematic factors in credit risk existed. Researchers after Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
applied market-wide variables when investigating determinants of CDS spreads 
(Dullmann and Sosinska (2007), Tang and Yan (2008), Shan et al., 2014)). Researchers 
like Delianedis and Geske (2001), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Longstaff et al. 
(1995) found three variables that are significant determinants of changes in the bond 
spread; changes in the spot rate, the slope of the yield curve, and a change in the CDS 
premium (market price of default risk). This is in accordance with Darwin et al. (2012) 
findings, which show that, on average, that a positive change in such variables is 
associated with reductions in the credit spreads. Delianedis and Geske’s (2001) study 
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shows that increases in liquidity in the bond market decreases the non-default 
component of the spread, however, it does not affect the default component. 
 Tang and Yan (2012) found that changes in firm and market fundamentals are 
the most significant determinants of corporate CDS spread changes. Secondly, they 
found a high explanatory power for CDS spread changes, an adjusted R-squared of 40% 
for the US market, and that firm level and market fundamentals account for two-thirds 
of the explained variation. Furthermore, they also found higher explanatory power 
compared to Ericsson et al. (2009) whose study was conducted before Tan and Yang 
(2012). An interesting finding in their study was that the VIX (same measure as 
VSTOXX in our paper) remains stable before and during the crisis, where volatility is 
more pronounced for non-financials and leverage is more pronounced for financials. 
This is explained by the fact that financials adjust leverage more frequently based on 
market conditions, which could potentially explain why individual firms’ default risk is 
the driver of the co-movement in corporate CDS spreads during the crisis, rather than 
market sentiment.          
 Moreover, they found that the stock return volatility, both at the firm level and 
at the market level, in explaining corporate CDS spread changes, is consistent with 
previous research conducted by (Ericsson et al. (2009), Zhang et al. (2009), Campbell 
and Taskler (2003)) who also concluded that volatility is the key determinant of CDS 
spreads in levels. The second most significant firm-level variable in changes, leverage, 
accounts for approximately 13% of the variation in CDS spreads. All firm-level variables 
together amount to an adjusted R-squared of 31% in explaining CDS spread changes. 
 The study of Darwin et al. (2012) which examines the determinants of bond 
spreads in Australia, found that many of the variables used in their analysis are highly 
significant with an R-squared of around 80% in levels and an adjusted R-squared of 
around 5% in changes. In particular, they found that the leverage is highly significant 
and negative; an indication that firms with a higher leverage ratio tend to have lower 
CDS spreads on average. However, it must be noted the study was done with a sample 
including financials, making it an imperfect measure of leverage. A remedy for this was 
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to exclude financials from the sample; the model specification now shows that leverage 
is insignificant for the sample, but significant and negative for financials. 
2.3. The Spillover Effect 
Research within the field of studying determinants of corporate CDS spreads and 
credit spreads, has primarily focused on firm-fundamental variables and various control 
variables. However, the onset of the global financial crisis following the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers has attracted attention in regards to concerns about how sovereign 
creditworthiness affects the credit risk of corporate sector. Therefore, the so-called 
transfer risk should be considered as a determinant of corporate CDS spreads. The 
definition of transfer risk can be viewed as a spillover from sovereign to corporate credit 
risk; where the government shifts the debt burden from the public sector to the private 
sector by increasing corporate taxes, or in extreme cases seizes private investments 
(Bedendo and Colla, 2013).         
 The transmission channels of the risk transfer from public-to-private can be 
explained by government linkage to the corporate sector. Firstly, government 
controlled firms, which is often the case for public hold telecommunications and energy 
(TMT and Energy sector) companies, enjoy cheaper borrowing costs and debt 
guarantees from the government. Faccio et al. (2006) studied 450 firms from 35 
countries and found that politically connected firms are more likely to enjoy 
government backing compared to similar unconnected firms. Secondly, financial 
institutions enjoy similar governmental backing in terms of guarantees. This is 
underlined by the “too-big-too-fail” argument because they are typically heavily 
exposed to domestic governments since they hold large amounts of domestic 
government bonds as assets.         
 A decrease in sovereign creditworthiness is often connected to disruptions in the 
domestic credit markets. A credit disruption would cause deleveraging of banks, which 
in turn would have negative effects on corporate lending. In other words, companies 
with higher proportions of bank debt could find it more difficult to renew existing 
loans, and are more vulnerable to credit disruptions, i.e. changes in sovereign credit 
risk. In addition, Borenztein et al. (2013) show that corporate credit ratings are 
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significantly affected by sovereign credit ratings, this is even more pronounced in 
countries with capital restrictions and higher political uncertainty.   
 Moreover, Almeida et al. (2013) found that firms, which are bounded by 
sovereign credit rating, reduce investment and leverage more in comparison to other 
companies. While research of sovereign to financial sector spillover is more extensive 
and has uncovered a significant spillover effect from the banking sector to the 
government during bailouts; after the bailout period the opposite spillover effect is 
evident (Adelino and Ferreira (2014), Ejsing and Lemke (2011) and Archarya et al. 
(2013)). However, the credit risk transfer from sovereign to non-financial companies is 
not an area that is as extensively studied.      
 Since previous research has mainly focused on the period before and during the 
crisis, this paper will also take into consideration the period after the global financial 
crisis. Separating our sample into financial and non-financial companies makes our 
research more comprehensive and sheds light upon the development of the spillover 
effect from sovereign credit risk to non-financial credit risk, as well as financial credit 
risk. Hence, this is done after controlling for the traditional determinants of corporate 
CDS spreads used in previous research, as well as adding a spillover variable that has 
been fairly neglected - the sovereign CDS spread. 
3. Data sample and methodology 
3.1. Data 
In this paper we will use a final sample comprising of monthly data on CDS 
quotes of 125 companies headquartered in the Eurozone5. Out of the 125 companies, 
100 are non-financials and 25 are financial companies. CDS quotes were retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream and accounting data from S&P Capital IQ. We opted to 
                                                           
5 We only consider the original 12 Eurozone members, which joined the European Monetary Union 
before 2002: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain 
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choose senior CDS contracts (modified modified restructuring6), denominated in euro 
with a maturity of 5 years quoted as mid-prices. We have elected to use five year CDS 
contacts since they represent the most liquid and frequently traded maturities (Pan and 
Singleton (2008), Dieckmann and Plank (2011), and Benkert (2004)).   
 The sample data covers the period from January 2004 to April 2014. The starting 
date is chosen as January 2004 as a very limited amount of CDS quotes are available 
before this date. Nevertheless, we have enough data points before the onset of the 
global financial crisis in order to examine if there is a structural break in the 
determinants of corporate CDS spreads before, during, and after the crisis. In 
accordance with Tang and Yan (2012) we use a monthly frequency of CDS quotes, due 
to the fact that some CDS contracts are not frequently traded.     
 In constructing our final sample, a special filtering technique is used to end up 
with a final sample of 125 companies headquartered in the Eurozone. This was done by 
starting with all available CDS contracts in DataStream. The CDS in DataStream are 
separated in two sources; CMA and Thomson Reuters. For the first data source (CMA), 
data was available from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2010, while for the latter 
source; data was available from the beginning of 2008 until today. Therefore, we had to 
match the two sources in order to get one time series of CDS quotes for the full time 
period starting in January 2004 and ending in April 2014. Due to this matching 
procedure we excluded companies, which did not have data available from both 
sources. To justifying our matching approach, we had to make sure that the overlapping 
data points of the two sources (beginning 2008 to the end of 2010) included the same 
CDS quotes, as well as the same restructuring clause in a credit event. As a last step, we 
excluded all non-listed companies. Ultimately, the filtering process left us with the most 
frequently traded and largest companies (measured by market capitalization) in the 
Eurozone. 
                                                           
6 The current ISDA agreement offers four options for treating the issue of restructuring. Under the 
modified-modified restructuring introduced in 2003, which is the most popular in Europe, deliverable 
obligations can be maturing in up to 60 months after a restructuring. 
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3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
Credit Default Spread (CDS Spread): The aim of the paper is to investigate which 
determinants explain corporate CDS spreads before, during, and after the global 
financial crisis. Hence, the dependent variable is the monthly CDS quote of senior CDS 
contracts (modified modified restructuring, introduced in 2003) with a maturity of 5 
years. 
3.2.2. Independent Variable 
The structural model framework of Merton (1974) provides us with an 
indication of which independent variables should be chosen. The probability of default 
is a function of financial leverage, asset volatility, and the risk free rate. In addition to 
these firm-specific variables, we use market wide variables as explanatory variables. In 
order to better understand how the selected variables affect corporate credit spreads 
(CDS spreads), we will discuss them individually. 
 
Firm-specific variables 
Financial Leverage: An increasing leverage (financial risk) is usually seen as a 
default trigger; where the probability of default increases, the distance to default 
decreases, resulting in an increase in corporate credit spreads. Thus, there is a positive 
correlation between leverage and credit spreads. As a measure of financial leverage, we 
use the ratio of total debt in relation to total debt plus market value of equity. Due to 
the fact that the market value is changing everyday and total debt is a quarterly 
accounting data, we get a daily measure of financial leverage. 
 
		
 = 	 		 + 
				 
 
Equity Volatility: In the Black-Scholes model (1973) increasing volatility leads to 
an increase in the call option price and the put option price. In the Merton model, the 
debt holder claims are represented by a short position in the put option. With 
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increasing volatility, the likelihood that the asset value will fall below the threshold 
increases resulting in wider corporate credit spreads. Since the asset value volatility is 
not observable, we use the equity volatility as a proxy. According to Ito’s lemma, a 
positive relationship between these two is seen to exist. Following Alexander and Kaeck 
(2008) we use a statistical volatility measure based on daily historical stock returns. For 
the historical volatility calculation, we use the firm’s annualized historical volatility of 
equity returns (assuming 252 trading days), computed as rolling standard deviation over 
the past 90 days to reflect current market conditions. 
 
Firm’s stock price: A higher share price (ex-post return) increases the equity 
value of the company. This results in a less levered firm implying a lower probability of 
default. A lower probability of default should drive down the firm’s credit spread. We 
use the monthly stock price and stock price changes for the specific company as an 
independent variable. 
 
Market-to-book ratio: According to Fama and French (1993), firms that have a 
higher market-to-book ratio (a high stock price relative to book value) tend to have 
persistently high earnings on assets. With higher future earnings, potential future 
contractual debt obligations are more likely to be met, thus decreasing the probability 
of default, as well as the corporate credit spread. We use the monthly market-to-book 
ratio as our measure. 
 
Firm Size: Fama and French (1993) argue that firm size is related to profitability. 
After controlling for market-to-book ratio, big firms tend to have higher earnings on 
assets than small firms. “The fact that small firms can suffer a long earnings depression 
that bypasses big firms”, means that there is a positive relation between size and 
earnings potential. As aforementioned, this will lead to a decreasing probability of 
default, and hence a tighter corporate credit spread. We use monthly data of the market 
value of equity as our firm size measure. 
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Market-wide variables 
Risk free interest rate (spot rate): A higher spot rate increases the risk-neutral 
drift for the firm value (asset value). The reason for this is that an increasing drift 
increases the distance to default, and therefore reduces the probability of default, which 
results in a decreasing corporate credit spread. As a proxy for the spot rate, we use the 
yield on a 1 year German government bond. This is justified by the fact that an AAA 
rating from all three major rating agencies was assigned to the German government 
bond during the whole sample period. Throughout the European sovereign debt crisis 
the highly liquid German government bond was considered the only risk free 
instrument in the Eurozone. 
 
The slope of the yield curve: According to Estrella and Mishkin (1997), the slope 
of the yield curve can be associated with a proxy for the business cycle movements. An 
increasing slope signals expectations about brighter economic activity. In consequence, 
this should result in a higher future spot rate, which will result in a lower probability of 
default due to the higher risk-neutral drift of the firm’s asset value (Ericsson et al., 2009) 
Hence, the steepness is therefore negatively related to the corporate credit spread. 
Consistent with Darwin et al. (2012); we calculate the slope of the yield curve as the 
difference between the 10 year and 1 year German government bond yield. 
 
Market wide volatility: Market wide volatility, which is used to capture market 
stress, displays a positive relationship with the corporate credit spread. This is due to 
the fact, higher volatility leads to higher uncertainty about the economic outlook. The 
market wide implied volatility is forward-looking as it captures the volatility of the 
asset returns in an option pricing model (Lopez and Navarro, 2012). To achieve this, we 
use the VSTOXX volatility index, which is calculated using the option prices on the 
EuroStoxx 50. 
 
Eurozone stock market: In accordance with a number of prominent studies on 
determinants of corporate credit spreads by Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and 
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Taksler (2003), and Ericsson et al. (2009); we have opted to use a Eurozone stock market 
index as an indicator of the overall state of the economy. A stronger development of the 
stock market index in the Eurozone is expected to have a negative effect on corporate 
credit spreads, since favorable business conditions are expected to lower the 
probabilities of default and increase recovery rates, overall. More specifically, we use 
the EuroStoxx 50 index to capture the overall economic condition in the Eurozone.  
 
Local stock market: Succeeding the asymmetric shock of the global financial 
crisis, the Eurozone has become increasingly divided into groups of countries following 
quite diverging parts in terms of real GDP growth rates (Landmann, 2011). As such, 
they have experienced different stock market developments. In order to account for the 
diverging development in the Eurozone, we use each countries own benchmark stock 
index. An improved development of each countries’ benchmark stock index, should 
result in a lower corporate credit spread. 
 
General state of the macro-economy: In addition to a lot of prominent studies, 
which mostly use overall stock market indices as an indicator of the overall state of the 
economy; we use the monthly industrial production index in the Eurozone as an 
independent variable for the business climate. The choice of this variable is based on 
the fact that the industrial production is historically highly correlated with GDP, but 
has the main advantage of being available in a monthly frequency, consistent with our 
data sample frequency. This proxy should be negatively related to the corporate credit 
spread.  
3.2.3. The Spillover Variable 
Sovereign credit spread: Based on the theoretical argument of the sovereign-to-
corporate credit risk spillover where a government in financial distress is likely to shift 
the debt burden from the public sector to the private sector; we shall assume that a 
higher sovereign credit spread results in a higher corporate credit spread. The measure 
for the sovereign credit spread is the monthly sovereign CDS quote of CDS contracts 
with a maturity of 5 years. As mentioned previously, 5 year sovereign CDS contracts a 
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highly liquid. Even so, changes to legislation governing sovereign CDS contracts in 
November 2011, which banned naked CDS positions and thus dried up liquidity, should 
be considered when interpreting the empirical results for the period after the global 
financial crisis (Capponi and Larsson, 2013).  
 
 
 
Table 1: Expected Sign of Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Expected sign
Leverage (+)
Volatility of firm's equity returns (+)
Firm's stock price (-)
Market-to-book ratio (-)
Size (market capitalization) (-)
Spot rate (-)
Slope of the yield curve (-)
VSTOXX (+)
EuroStoxx 50 (-)
Local stock index (-)
Industrial production euro area (-)
Sovereign credit spread (+)
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3.3. Methodology 
3.3.1. Firm-Fixed-Effects Model  
Given the theoretical arguments and empirical research previously discussed to 
determine factors affecting corporate CDS spreads, we estimate the following panel 
regression models (levels): 
 =	 +  !"# + $#%!& + '()*" + +,# + -# + .(%
+ /!%(" + 0#%11 + 2%1150 +  !_*6"1
+   *(_"7 +  $ +	8 
Where  stands for firms’ credit default spread premium in basis points; !"# 
is firm leverage, defined as book value of debt divided by market value of firm plus 
book value of debt; #%!& is the 90-day historical volatility of firm’s equity returns; 
()*" is the firm’s stock price; ,# is market-to-book ratio, defined as market value 
of firm divided by book value of firm; # is the market value of the firm (market 
capitalization) as a measure of size; (% represents the one-year risk free government 
bond yield; !%(" is the difference between 10-year and one-year risk free 
government bond yield; #%11 is a proxy for market stress using implied volatilities; 
%1150 represents the devolopment of the overall European stock market; !_*6"1 
represents the level of the local stock market index; *(_"7 stands for the Industrial 
Production Index in the Eurozone; and		 stand for the sovereign credit spread, 
defined as the credit default spread premium in basis points.    
 Due to the obstacles that present themselves when using panel data, such as 
autocorrelation, heterogeneity etc. we have to specify our regression model accordingly 
to achieve unbiased and efficient estimators. Since we have heterogeneity properties in 
the cross-section dimension (see Table 6), we have to use either fixed effects or random 
effects specification. In applying the Hausman test, we shall reject the null hypothesis 
which states that the random effects model is well specified, and instead use fixed 
effects in the cross-section dimension. This approach is a remedy for the heterogeneity 
properties in the panel data sample. 
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Introducing firm-fixed effects results in the following model estimation 
 =	 +  !"# + $#%!& + '()*" + +,# + -# + .(% +
/!%(" + 0#%11 + 2%1150 +  !_*6"1 +   *(_"7 +  $ +
	9 +	8  
Where 9 is fixed for each firm in the cross-section, and all other variables 
represent the same meaning as previously mentioned.     
 After accounting for heterogeneity in the data sample, we have to account for 
autocorrelation as well. An average Durbin-Watson test statistic value between 0.10 
and 0.20 signals a highly positive autocorrelation in error terms, which provides us with 
biased and inefficient estimators. A remedy for autocorrelation is first-differencing our 
variables. Since we have non-stationary CDS spreads in our data sample, using first-
differencing also accounts for the potential non-stationarity problem. According to the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, with time trend and intercept the null hypothesis of unit 
root in CDS levels is only rejected for 15 out of 125 companies at the 5% significance 
level. Using changes in CDS spreads the variables are stationary. 
3.3.2. First-Differencing Model 
The model in first difference form is estimated as follows (changes): 
∆ =	 +  ∆!"# + $∆#%!& + '∆()*" + +∆,# + -∆# + .∆(%
+ /∆!%(" + 0∆#%11 + 2∆%1150 +  ∆!_*6"1
+   ∆*(_"7 +  $∆ +	8 
Where ∆ stands for the change in the given variable. 
After getting rid of the autocorrelation and the heterogeneity in the panel data 
we account as a last step for heteroscedasticity in the residuals by using robust standard 
errors.            
 In summary, we use two multivariate regression models for the determinants of 
levels and changes in corporate CDS spreads. Specifically a firm fixed effects model and 
a first-differencing model, of which both are estimated by the Ordinary Least Squared 
method. The reason for using these two model specifications lays in the fact that in the 
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case of a time period of two (T=2), the fixed effects estimator and the first-difference 
estimator are numerically equivalent (Wooldridge, 2002). However, when T is greater 
or equal to 3, the two estimators can differ depending on the serial correlation in the 
error terms (Wooldridge, 2002). The Firm fixed effects estimator only outperforms the 
first-difference estimator in efficiency when the error terms are serially uncorrelated. 
Due to their similarities, we therefore consider both estimators in our model 
specification, bringing it in line with Darwin et al. (2012). 
3.3.3. Principal Component Analysis 
Before conducting any regressions, we run a Principal Component Analysis, in 
order to find sources of communalities (common factors) in corporate CDS spreads. The 
Principal component analysis (PCA) approach, describes the variation in multivariate-
setting using linear combinations of variables. The purpose of the PCA approach is to 
extract the principal component that best explains the variation in corporate CDS 
spreads, and then implement regression analysis to determine which of our variables 
has the highest correlation with the extracted principal component (PC). PC1 is the 
linear combination of the variables that together stand for the highest variance. PC2 is 
the linear combination of the variables with the highest variance of the remaining 
variables and so forth. Furthermore, PC1 and PC2 have to be uncorrelated with each 
other (Johnson and Wichern, 2002).  
																																																( =	  ;< = +  $;<$= + ⋯+  ?;<?=                                 
Where the PC1 represents the first extracted principal component,  @ represents the 
loading observed for variable x and <? represents the score of variable x. 
3.3.4. Granger-Causality Test 
In this paper we use the Granger’s causality test to examine how much of the 
current corporate CDS spreads can be explained by historical sovereign CDS spread 
changes. Our model specification assumes throughout the paper that there is a spillover 
effect from sovereign credit to corporate credit, especially for GIIPS compared to 
CORE. Additionally, we apply this approach to our different panels (Financials vs. non-
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financials, GIIPS vs. CORE). This is done in order to see if the Ganger causality test is in 
line with our econometric results. The Granger’s causality model is expressed as follows: 
1 =AB1CB +ABDCB + 
E
BF 
E
BF 
 
D =AB1CB +ABDCB + G
E
BF 
E
BF 
 
In the equations above, m represents the number of lags included in the model, 
and the two error-terms  and G are assumed to be two white-noise (heteroscedastic 
and no autocorrelation) (Granger, 1969). The first equation is interpreted in the 
following; D is granger causing 1 if B is not zero. The null hypothesis is that Y does 
not granger cause X, which basically means that: 
     H:  =	$=….= J= 0.  
 If the granger’s causality test shows that  ≠ J, this indicates that D granger 
causes 1, then we reject the H since there is evidence that  ≠ J (non-zero). Further, 
if D granger causes 1 and the opposite is evident that 1 granger causes D at the same 
time then we have a bidirectional effect (Hassan, Ngene and Suk-Yu, 2011). 
4. Empirical Results 
In this section, we present our results with a main focus on !"# and . !"# is 
an important determinant of corporate CDS spreads in both levels and changes across all 
sub-periods. According to our findings, and from a Merton model perspective, it is the 
variable that explains most of the variation in the dependent variable. In addition, our 
new variable  and our contribution to existing research, is emphasized in our 
analysis of our multiple panels (A-J). Before analyzing the determinants of corporate 
CDS spreads, we first show the results from our principal component analysis. 
4.1. Principal Component Analysis 
Table 7 shows the summary statistics of the principal component analysis of the 
correlation matrix of levels in corporate CDS spreads, as well as changes between 
January 2004 and April 2014, including the sub-periods. The first principal component 
in levels for the overall period explains 69.85% of the total variation. The second 
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principal component explains 15.31%, and lastly, the third principal component 3.06% 
of the variation. The first five principal components explain approximately 92% in 
levels. When taking changes into regard, instead of levels, the first principal component 
explain 44.62% of the total variation, the second principal component explains 10.23%, 
the third principal component explains 5.56%, and the first five principal components 
explain approximately 67% of the total variation. These findings, although slightly 
higher, are supported by (Bedendo and Colla, 2013) who finds 47% for the first 
principal component and 60% for the first five principal components in changes. 
Conversely, these findings are slightly lower than Collin-Dufresne (2001), who finds 
that the first PC explains 75% whilst the second explains an additional 6%. When using 
our market-wide explanatory variables, and measuring the correlation with the first 
principal component (Table 8), we can conclude that the two most common factors we 
use in our multivariate analysis show the highest correlation; %1150 and #%11. 
These findings confirm that corporate CDS spreads are co-vary with these two general 
market indicators, which still cannot take into account all the changes in corporate CDS 
spreads. 
4.2. Overall Results 
Table 9 and 10, firm fixed effects specification and first-difference specification, 
respectively, represent the results from the multivariate regressions designed to 
investigate the determinants of corporate CDS spread levels and spread changes.  
Comparing our two model specifications, the firm fixed effects model explaining levels 
has a better fit in terms of R-squared in comparison to the first difference model 
explaining the changes of corporate CDS spreads, which exhibits lower R-squared, and 
are in line with Darwin et al. (2012). The explanation for this is that in first-
differencing the variables information is lost, resulting in a lower fit of the regression 
model.            
 Overall, some variables are no longer significant in changes across all sub-
periods. However, for our main variable of interest,  is significant for both model 
specifications across all panels. In terms of the firm fixed effects model, we can see that 
many of the variables chosen for this analysis are highly significant before, during, and 
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after the global financial crisis. Together, the variables explain around 65-85% of the 
corporate CDS spread levels; in line with Darwin et al. (2012) study’ of determinants of 
bond spreads using levels and changes, which finds an explanatory power of 80% to 
86% for the levels of bond spreads. This is a significantly higher explanatory power 
compared to the R-squared of 40% found by Tan and Yang (2012).   
 When comparing the signs of our variables we notice that they are mostly in line 
with the expected sign (Table 1), with minor deviations depending on if the sub-period 
is before, during, or after the global financial crisis. We find a significant positive 
relationship between sovereign CDS spreads () and corporate CDS spreads. This 
effect is notably stronger after the global financial crisis, which could be an indication 
that that the spillover effect from sovereign to the corporate sector has intensified after 
the global financial crisis with the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis, as 
supported by (Bedendo and Colla, 2013). Before the crisis, a one unit increase in  
increased the corporate CDS spreads by 0.1 unit on average; during the crisis an increase 
in  increased the corporate CDS spread by 0.13; and after the crisis this figure 
amounted to 0.57, which exhibits the increased importance of this variable after the 
crisis compared to before, in levels.       
 After the crisis, the variation explained by !"# and  significantly increased 
to around 85% of the total variation. The size of company measured by market 
capitalization (#) is not in line with the expected sign of the # variable. Since our 
data sample is biased due to a selection of the largest companies in the Eurozone, the 
results are not in line with the expected sign (Table 1). !%(" and (% are 
significant, in line with the expected signs (see Table1), and in accordance with  
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Longstaff et al. (1995) research. However in our 
paper, we find that (% has a higher effect on corporate CDS spreads after the crisis in 
comparison to !%(".         
 Analyzing !"# and  in changes, it is evident that !"# is only highly 
significant after the crisis with a significant positive effect on corporate CDS spreads in 
changes. The  is highly significant before and after the financial crisis, but 
insignificant during. The !%(" and (% are highly significant before and during the 
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crisis where the signs are in-line with the expected signs. The *(_"7 is highly 
significant before and during the crisis with the correct expected sign when analyzing it 
in changes. In level terms, *(_"7 exhibits the wrong expected sign. An explanation for 
this could be that Industrial Production measures real output, which means that there 
will be an increasing positive trend in the time-series making it non-stationary. This 
positive increasing trend will push down corporate CDS spreads in the long run; hence, 
the levels cannot capture this effect since it measures the development along linearity. 
However, in changes, it captures this effect since it measures changes between periods, 
and gives the right expected sign. The overall fit of the first-differencing model ranges 
from 11% before, to 27% after the crisis. 
4.3. Non-financials vs. Financials 
Table 11 (non-financials) and Table 13 (financials) show the determinants of 
corporate CDS spread levels, which of the variables are the major determinants, and 
how they differ depending on if the company is a financial company or a non-financial 
company.  
 As mentioned in section 2, there’s a linkage between financials and the 
respective government. This is because financials hold exposure towards governments 
in form of bond holdings on their balance sheet, and are intuitively more likely to be 
affected by the government’s creditworthiness. As the creditworthiness of a country is 
negatively affected, it will affect financials more compared to non-financials, as evident 
in Table 11 to 14 and supported by Almeida et al. (2013), Borenztein et al. (2013) and 
particularly Faccio et al. (2006) study’, which finds that politically connected firms are 
more likely to enjoy government backing compared to unconnected firms. This is 
especially the case for financials, since they are vital for a well-functioning society. 
However, the results differ depending on if we were to measure it in levels or changes. 
 In level terms, a one unit increase in  before the global financial crisis 
increased the CDS spreads by 0.122, during the crisis it increased by 0.403, and after the 
crisis it increased by 0.616 units for financials in levels (Table 13). These results in 
comparison to the changes (Table 14) in ; where a unit increase in the change of 
 before implies a 0.096 increase in the change of the corporate CDS spread before, 
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0.387 during and 0.285 unit increase after the crisis for financial institutions.   
 For non-financials, the  is highly significant during all sub-periods, and also 
displays a slightly greater effect of  in levels compared to changes (Table 11 and 12). 
In accordance with our theoretical arguments in section 2, financial companies do show 
evidence of a larger spillover effect from sovereign credit risk to corporate credit risk in 
the firm fixed effects specification. Due to the fact, financials hold some exposure in the 
form of government bonds, they enjoy some government guarantee. This is supported 
by Faccio et al. (2006) study’ that politically connected firms are more likely to be 
bailed-out compared to unconnected ones. 
 Another interesting finding, is that non-financials were seen as a safe haven 
during the global financial crisis as the  is significant at the 5 % significance level 
and negative, which explains the shift in the flow of capital from financials to non-
financials during the crisis; as supported by Bedendo and Colla (2013).  
Analyzing the most widely used firm-specific variable !"#, and its effect for 
financials compared to non-financials, we can see that it is insignificant for both panels 
and model specifications during all periods, except for the firm fixed effects model after 
the global financial crisis. 
4.4. CORE vs. GIIPS 
Table 17 exhibits a significant and steady increase of the effect of  on 
corporate CDS spread levels, where a unit increase in changes for corporate CDS 
spreads ranging from 0.07 before to 0.549 unit increase after the global financial crisis in 
levels for GIIPS. An adjusted R-squared of 76% before the financial crisis to an adjusted 
R-squared of 85.2% after the financial crisis, could potentially explain the increased 
importance of the  after the financial crisis compared to before for companies 
headquartered in GIIPS countries. The !"# is highly significant during all sub-periods 
with a slight decrease during the crisis but with an increasing impact of the !"# on 
corporate CDS spreads in the after period.      
 When comparing the CORE with GIIPS (Table 15 and 17) countries, we can see 
that there is a similar increasing trend in  in levels from before to the after period 
with a slight deviation where the  is insignificant during the financial crisis. This is 
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an interesting indication that shows us that this particular variable was an insignificant 
determinant of corporate CDS spreads during the crisis, compared to after where it is 
highly significant with an R-squared of 82% compared to an R-squared of 73% before 
the crisis. The impact of  in changes shows an interesting pattern for GIIPS (table 
18) where the  variable is significant before and after, but insignificant during the 
crisis. The impact of  exhibits a significant increase from the before period to the 
after period. Another important indicator of the increasing importance of the  after 
the global financial crisis, is the increasing adjusted R-squared of 12% to 34% in the 
after period.           
 We notice that the !"# variable is not only highly significant but has a large 
effect on corporate CDS spreads before, during, and after where a one unit increase in 
!"# implies a 187.7 unit increase in the corporate CDS spreads before the financial 
crisis. This is in comparison to its increasing importance after the financial crisis where 
this unit increase now implies a 540.1 unit increase in corporate CDS spreads, which is a 
significant increase of the effect of the !"# on corporate CDS spreads in levels. The fact 
that !"# is highly significant, apart from the  variable in our paper, and it being one 
of the major determinants of corporate CDS spreads is supported by Tang and Yan 
(2012), Ericsson et al. (2009) and Darwin et al. (2012).     
 The impact of the !"# variable is interesting when looking at the changes where 
it is insignificant before and during the crisis, but reasonably high after the crisis for 
GIIPS countries. The similar pattern is evident for the CORE countries, however, the 
impact of !"# in the after crisis period is greater for CORE compared to GIIPS. A 
potential explanation for this could be that market participants consider firm-specific 
variables like !"# more for companies headquartered in CORE countries, whereas 
companies headquarters in the GIIPS countries consider  as a more relevant driver 
of corporate CDS spreads.         
 The adjusted R-squared differ slightly between GIIPS and CORE where it 
increases from 12% to 34% for GIIPS and 10% to 23% for CORE. This could be an 
indication that there could be other variables besides  and !"# that better explains 
the determinants for corporate CDS spreads for the CORE countries before, during and 
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after.           
 When looking at the single countries within GIIPS and CORE (Table 29), we see 
that  is overall highly significant for the companies headquartered in Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece and where the magnitude of the effect follows the same order where 
 in Portugal shows 0.711 and 0.003 for Greece. However, the magnitude of the 
effect of the  on corporate CDS spreads in the respective countries changes after the 
crisis with Italy (0.712) being the country with the highest effect of  is evident, 
followed by Portugal (0.530), Spain (0.348) and Greece (0.002).   
 Overall, the result show that the effect of  increases for these four countries 
over time, with the exception of Portugal, which exhibits a slightly lower  effect on 
corporate CDS spreads after the crisis. An explanation to this could be that the spillover 
effect for companies headquartered in GIIPS countries is overall more evident 
compared to the CORE countries, who are significant at 5% level with a minor effect of 
sovereign CDS spread changes explaining corporate CDS spread changes. It is 
interesting to add that we expected Greece to be the country where the  would 
normally be the driving factor of corporate CDS spreads, but it is not the case since 
there is a decoupling starting in August 2011, when the sovereign CDS spread of Greece 
increased significantly reaching extreme values (see Figure 2) whilst on the other hand, 
the corporate CDS spreads of companies headquartered in Greece kept moving 
sideways. 
4.5. Sector-Specific Results 
As evident in section 4.2 where non-financials during the financial crisis were 
seen as a safe haven when market participants started shifting capital from the 
struggling financial sector to the non-financial, we now analyze this relationship even 
further by analyzing sectors within the non-financials. Overall, the non-financial 
sectors show that the  is highly significant for all sectors - Auto & Industrials, 
Consumer, Energy, Financial services and TMT (Table 19-28) for both specification 
models.           
 Looking at the sectors during the crisis and the effect of , we see that  is 
highly significant for all sectors with one exception; TMT (Table 27), which is 
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insignificant in levels. What is interesting when analyzing the sectors individually, is 
that the safe haven argument is not only evident but also valid for two sectors; Energy 
and TMT. Both the Energy and TMT (Table 24 & 28) sector do enjoy some sort of 
government backing, either in terms of government bond holdings or government 
guarantees. This is particularly evident during the crisis where the  is highly 
significant and negative. This implies that the pattern we saw in section 4.2 that 
corporate CDS spreads were decreasing when sovereign CDS spread increased during 
the global financial crisis was evident for these two sectors, indicating that there was a 
shift in the flow of capital from financials to non-financials and more specifically these 
two sectors.           
 For the Energy sector we can see that a one-unit change increase in  shows 
that the corporate CDS spreads decrease by 0.382 units. The same pattern is evident for 
the TMT sector but is stronger; a one-unit change increase in  shows a 0.552 unit 
decrease in corporate CDS spreads. The opposite was true after the financial crisis; a 
change in a one unit increase in  shows a change of 0.294 unit increase in CDS 
spreads of corporate CDS spreads for the Energy sector. The same pattern is repeated in 
the TMT sector but with a slightly higher effect of the  on corporate CDS spreads 
(0.389). This repeating argument further strengthens the safe haven argument for non-
financials, as both Energy and TMT sectors are to some extent backed by their 
respective government. An explanation could be that during the financial crisis, only 
financials were in real trouble and on the verge of collapse, which caused a shift in 
capital allocation for market participants seeking safe havens to allocate their capital. 
These safe havens were companies categorized as non-financials, more specifically the 
Energy and TMT sector as our results show.      
 The fact that the  and the corporate CDS spreads are positive after the 
financial crisis, could explain that capital that was invested in the Energy and TMT 
sector during the crisis was later invested elsewhere. This is because before the global 
financial crisis the thought of countries going bankrupt was non-existent, but when the 
financial crisis, caused by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, hit the global financial 
markets and shook it to its core, it made market participants start to believe that 
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countries could go bankrupt. This is supported by the fact that  and corporate CDS 
spreads are not only positive but also highly significant, both in terms of significance 
level and the effect of  on corporate CDS spreads after the financial crisis. This 
analysis shows that the spillover effect from sovereign credit risk to corporate credit 
risk is more evident after the financial crisis, and that the effect of the  variable has 
increased in magnitude across all sub-periods, but especially following the recent global 
financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis.  
 
Running all the regressions without our  variable and comparing the 
adjusted R-squared with the regressions including the  variable we can see that the 
R-squared increase in changes is greater for financials 98.6% compared to non-
financials 31.2% when looking at the period, overall. The same pattern is repeated for 
GIIPS compared to CORE, where GIIPS exhibits a 104% increase in adjusted R-squared 
compared to 2% increase in the adjusted R-squared for the CORE countries. Looking at 
the sub-periods, we notice a clear pattern which shows that after the global financial 
crisis the increase in adjusted R-squared is more pronounced compared to before and 
during the crisis. Including the  variable after the crisis, increases the adjusted R-
squared to approximately 50%. This analysis underlines the increased importance of 
 as a determinant of corporate CDS spreads after the global financial crisis, in 
particular for companies headquartered in the GIIPS countries. 
4.6. Additional Results 
 Table 30 shows the summary statistics of the Granger causality test using three 
lags representing three months. In order to do so, we test the causality of each company 
with its respective sovereign. Out of the 125 bivariate Granger causality tests, the 
average and median p-value is calculated, as well as the number of pairs for which the 
causality using three lags is significant at the 5% level. In addition we show the results 
for our panels: financials vs. non-financials and GIIPS vs. CORE.   
 There is evidence that after the global financial crisis and with the onset of the 
European sovereign debt crisis, the three historical lags of the sovereign CDS spread 
changes are better in explaining today’s changes in corporate CDS spread changes. 
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However, this not as evident for the historical corporate CDS spread changes in 
explaining today’s sovereign CDS spread changes. In other words, it means that 
sovereign CDS spread changes are Granger cause corporate CDS spread changes. We 
can conclude that the direction of the spillover effect after the global crisis goes from 
sovereign credit risk to corporate credit risk, and is even more pronounced for the 
companies headquartered in the GIIPS countries.     
 During the global financial crisis period, we can see the opposite causality while 
this effect is less pronounced, which is supported by Corzo et al. (2012). They conclude 
that during the period of Lehman Brother’s collapse, a private-to-public risk transfer 
took place, whereas for the European sovereign debt crisis period they found a risk 
transfer from public-to-private. This evidence does not only support our findings in the 
empirical results section that the effect of the  variable after the global financial 
crisis is more important in explaining level and changes in corporate CDS spreads, but 
also since unidirectional causality from sovereign to corporate is evident. 
5. Conclusion 
Based on a sample of 125 companies headquartered in the Eurozone, our 
investigation based on the theoretical arguments of the Merton model including 
additional theoretical arguments and variables, found evidence that only leverage is an 
important firm-specific driver that affects corporate CDS spreads, while the rest of the 
variation is mainly explained by common factors such as VSTOXX. However, the most 
significant explanatory variable in explaining determinants of corporate CDS spreads is 
the sovereign CDS spread, especially after the global financial crisis. Including our main 
contribution to existing research, the sovereign CDS spread increases the fit of our 
multivariate model by 50% proportionally after the financial crisis, which is a quite 
remarkable result.         
 Depending on the model specification as well as the panel selection in 
determining the corporate CDS spreads, our estimates measured in changes show on 
average that a one unit increase in sovereign CDS spread implies a 0.3 unit increase in 
the corporate CDS spread over the whole period. Analyzing the period after the 
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financial crisis, we find that for companies headquartered in the GIIPS countries a one 
unit increase in sovereign CDS spread implies a 0.34 increase in corporate CDS spread 
on average. Whilst for the companies headquartered in the CORE countries, a one unit 
increase in sovereign CDS spreads implies only a 0.09 unit increase in corporate CDS 
spreads on average. This shows that the sovereign-to-corporate spillover effect is 
evident for both, but more pronounced for companies headquartered in GIIPS 
countries. However, changes in the legislation for sovereign CDS contracts in 
November 2011 banned naked CDS positions and therefore dried up liquidity, which 
should be kept in mind when interpreting our empirical results.  
 When comparing the direction of the spillover effect from sovereign-to-
corporate versus corporate-to-sovereign, we found that during the global financial crisis 
the spillover effect goes from financials to sovereign, which means that there was a 
private-to-public risk transfer. Conversely, after the crisis the spillover effect is more 
pronounced for public-to-private, namely sovereign to non-financials.   
 The asymmetric shock of the global financial crisis brought up the 
macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone. In consequence, the Eurozone became 
increasingly divided into groups of countries following quite diverging parts. This 
divergence was not only apparent in GDP growth rates, unit labor costs, trade and 
capital flows and public-sector debt, but also in diverging borrowing costs for 
sovereigns and the private sector. With the onset of the European sovereign debt crisis 
the companies headquartered in the GIIPS countries lost their competitive advantage 
compared to companies headquartered in the CORE as a result of higher borrowing 
costs for the sovereigns. This translates into higher borrowing costs for the private 
sector due to the apparent sovereign-to-corporate spillover effect. A number of reforms 
to restore the GIIPS countries competitiveness, rein in new public deficits, as well as 
the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions program, have helped to strengthen 
investors confidence in the GIIPS countries creditworthiness. With regard to this 
initiative, corporate CDS spreads in the GIIPS have decreased sharply, which coincides 
with a reduce in firm’s borrowing cost, which in turn can foster economic growth in 
the Eurozone. Implementing measures that address loosening the relation that amplifies 
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sovereign-to-corporate spillover effects may help stabilize corporate borrowing costs in 
the Eurozone. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 2: Detailed description of explanatory variables 
This table provides a detailed description of the explanatory variables included in the 
firm fixed effects model. The same variables are included in the first-differencing 
model, where ∆ stands for the change in the given variable. In addition, the variable’s 
data source is shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Desciption Source
LEV Firm's leverage, defined as total debt divided by market value of firm 
and total debt
Capital IQ
VOLA Firm's annulized historical volatility of equity returns, computed as 
rolling standard deviation over the past 90 days
Datastream
PRICE Firm's stock price Datastream
MBV Market-to-book ratio, defined as market value of firm divided by 
book value of firm
Datastream
MV Market value of firm (market capitalization) as a measure of size Datastream
SPOT 1-year risk free government bond yield (AAA Germany) Datastream
SLOPE Difference between 10-year and 1-year risk free government bond 
yield (AAA Germany)
Datastream
VSTOXX Annualized implied volatility of the EuroStoxx 50 Datastream
STOXX50 EuroStoxx 50 index Datastream
L_INDEX Local stock market benchmark index of single eurozone country Datastream
IP_EU Industrial production index of the eurozone Datastream
Spillover variable
SCS Sovereign credit spread, defined as 5-year sovereign CDS spread Datastream
Firm-specific variables
Market-wide variables
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics of corporate CDS spreads, firm-specific variables 
and sovereign credit spread (sovereign CDS spread) for Panel A-J. The summary 
statistics are presented for the overall period, January 2004 to April 2014. All variables 
are presented in levels. 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: All 125
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 156.38 0.49 27.08 32.80 1.79 19504.33 9844.57 157.85
Median 83.424 0.43 17.06 23.48 1.48 11221.26 7054.24 29.98
Std.dev. 23.74 0.27 41.86 31.64 3.23 21284.91 10397.72 1167.10
Obs. 13777 13777 13777 13777 13777 13777 13777 13777
Firms 125 125 125 125 125 125 125 125
Panel B: Non-Financials
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 142.79 0.40 28.00 35.40 1.97 19630.14 8737.54 91.65
Median 80.34 0.35 18.61 26.58 1.63 11502.90 6916.50 29.14
Std.dev. 204.71 0.21 43.05 31.49 3.58 21594.03 9130.59 761.38
Obs. 10867 10867 10867 10867 10867 10867 10867 10867
Firms 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Panel C: Financials
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 207.11 0.84 23.65 23.06 1.12 19034.51 13978.62 407.71
Median 102.81 0.87 9.71 10.15 0.94 10260.90 8289.30 39.33
Std.dev. 327.50 0.14 36.85 30.25 0.91 20085.15 13375.54 2058.45
Obs. 2910 2910 2910 2910 2910 2910 2910 2910
Firms 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
Panel D: Core
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 127.94 0.43 32.97 42.03 1.82 19099.67 5756.18 32.72
Median 78.29 0.36 23.12 32.33 1.58 11047.73 6291.90 25.42
Std.dev. 178.87 0.26 45.11 37.38 1.57 20690.58 2618.14 34.06
Obs. 11352 11142 11280 11281 10798 11281 11656 11656
Firms 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
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Panel E : GIIPS
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 234.91 0.65 9.51 10.59 1.78 18840.20 21326.66 523.35
Median 112.20 0.70 5.59 6.30 1.23 9546.08 14755.20 104.92
Std.dev. 334.37 0.24 17.17 13.53 6.00 22034.53 14664.14 2271.39
Obs. 3611 3611 3611 3611 3611 3611 3611 3611
Firms 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Panel F: Auto&Industrials
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 142.94 0.40 38.79 44.99 1.64 17687.60 8550.75 36.78
Median 78.92 0.36 29.11 39.20 1.49 10213.93 6670.04 23.16
Std.dev. 198.21 0.21 61.65 32.21 0.87 19278.55 8966.98 51.42
Obs. 4041 4041 4041 4041 4041 4041 4041 4041
Firms 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Panel G: Consumer
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 166.68 0.35 25.34 36.71 2.15 15410.44 6103.55 50.35
Median 84.00 0.30 19.93 31.16 2.12 10542.96 6665.06 32.49
Std.dev. 225.60 0.22 20.05 26.66 0.89 15169.17 3072.87 79.73
Obs. 1883 1883 1883 1883 1883 1883 1883 1883
Firms 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Panel H: Energy
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 88.98 0.47 19.49 27.67 2.41 30885.29 13336.73 89.82
Median 60.00 0.43 20790,00 19.08 1.55 22402.82 8643.00 39.70
Std.dev. 100.24 0.25 23.73 29.56 8.13 29058.56 11689.37 132.53
Obs. 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915 1915
Firms 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Panel I : Financial Services
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 107.04 0.37 37.72 50.12 1.17 20361.70 9686.89 42.16
Median 75.04 0.32 21.25 28.68 1.04 19213.40 6937.17 25.49
Std.dev. 130.99 0.18 39.17 43.03 0.58 17085.17 10506.68 59.44
Obs. 964 964 964 964 964 964 964 964
Firms 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
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SPOT SLOPE VSTOXX STOXX50 IP_EU
Mean 1.70 1.46 23.68 828.16 103.92
Median 1.51 1.76 21.38 817.22 103.07
Std.dev. 1.56 0.89 9.14 141.74 5.96
Obs. 13777 13777 13777 13777 13777
Firms 125 125 125 125 125
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics for market-wide variables 
This table shows the summary statistics for the market-wide variables used in the 
regression analysis. These variables are the same for all 125 companies in the sample. 
The summary statistics are presented for the overall period, January 2004 to April 2014. 
All variables are presented in levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel J: TM T
CDS LEV VOLA PRICE MBV MV L_INDEX SCS
Mean 187.32 0.37 12.66 15.72 2.41 16498.70 6795.71 271.66
Median 102.24 0.35 9.58 14.17 2.08 6692.11 5728.58 29.50
Std.dev. 272.45 0.18 11.56 11.93 1.74 21150.38 8031.04 1746.33
Obs. 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064
Firms 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
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Table 5: Headquarters by country 
The table shows the distribution of the 125 companies’ headquarters in the data sample 
by countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Headquarters
Country Total Share
France 38 30.4%
Germany 33 26.4%
Italy 14 11.2%
Netherlands 10 8.0%
Spain 9 7.2%
Finland 6 4.8%
Portugal 3 2.4%
Greece 3 2.4%
Belgium 3 2.4%
Austria 3 2.4%
Ireland 2 1.6%
Luxembourg 1 0.8%
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Table 6: Firm heterogeneity 
The following table shows the unobserved heterogeneity in our data sample for 
different panels as well as sub-periods. A higher increase in adjusted R-squared is a 
proxy for more evident heterogeneity. In the case of no heterogeneity there should be 
no increase in adjusted R-squared when using fixed effects since the cross-section 
dummies have no explanatory power. Using firm fixed effects is a remedy for the 
existing heterogeneity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Increase in adjusted R-squared using firm fixed effects compared to  pooled regression
Overall Before During After Average
Panel A: All 125 42.49% 314.93% 228.89% 58.57% 161.22%
Panel B: Non-Financials 64.12% 187.05% 113.47% 91.31% 113.99%
Panel C: Financials 10.20% 12.81% 147.98% 27.29% 49.57%
Panel D: PIIGS 20.88% 427.60% 168.98% 43.72% 165.30%
Panel E: Core 96.30% 204.49% 189.31% 158.24% 162.09%
Panel F: Auto&Industrials 35.94% 140.82% 109.71% 34.43% 80.22%
Panel G: Consumer 22.09% 22.21% 28.46% 39.70% 28.12%
Panel H: Energy 11.27% 18.92% 47.82% 35.08% 28.27%
Panel I: Financial Services 18.60% 37.25% 42.70% 3.23% 25.44%
Panel J: TMT 52.20% 128.86% 65.10% 58.86% 76.25%
37.41% 149.49% 114.24% 55.04% 89.05%
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Table 7: Principal Component Analysis 
The following tables report the summary statistics for the principal component analysis 
of the correlation matrix of monthly levels in corporate CDS spreads, as well as monthly 
changes in corporate CDS spreads between January 2004 and April 2014 (Overall). In 
addition, results are presented for the sub-periods before, during and after. The 
percentage of variance explained is reported for the first five components. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal component analyses in CDS levels
Principal 
Component
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
First 69.85 69.85 72.05 72.05 68.50 68.50 65.84 65.84
Second 15.31 85.16 10.65 82.70 12.31 80.81 13.38 78.78
Third 3.06 88.22 4.39 87.09 5.09 85.90 5.30 84.08
Fourth 2.24 90.46 3.03 90.12 4.09 89.99 4.25 88.33
Fifth 1.79 92.25 1.59 91.71 2.31 92.30 2.63 90.96
Overall Before During After
Principal component analyses in CDS changes
Principal 
Component
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
Variation 
Explained
(%)
Total 
(%)
First 44.62 44.62 55.03 55.03 46.01 46.01 56.65 56.65
Second 10.23 54.85 7.22 62.25 13.53 59.54 7.20 63.85
Third 5.56 60.41 4.71 66.96 8.86 68.40 3.43 67.28
Fourth 3.58 63.99 3.47 70.43 6.07 74.47 3.35 70.63
Fifth 3.19 67.18 2.80 73.23 5.21 79.68 2.76 73.39
Overall Before During After
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Table 8: Correlation with first principal component 
The following tables report the linear correlation coefficients between the first 
principal component (Table 7) and the global market-wide factors as defined in section 
3.2.2. in levels as well as changes. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9-28: Determinants of corporate CDS spread levels and changes 
The following tables show the multivariate results for the determinants of corporate 
CDS spread levels using a firm fixed effects model (a) and determinants for changes in 
corporate CDS spreads using a first-differencing model (b). All regressions are fitted 
using the Ordinary Least Squared method and heteroscedastic robust standard errors. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The results 
are presented for all 10 panels (A-J). The time period is split into three sub-periods. 
Before is defined from January 2004 to April 2008, during from May 2008 to April 2010 
after from May 2010 to April 2014 and overall from January 2004 to April 2014. 
 
Overall Before During After
SPOT -0.700*** -0.038 -0.267 -0.308**
SLOPE 0.590*** 0.106 0.325 0.017
VSTOXX 0.765*** 0.602*** 0.868*** 0.693***
STOXX50 -0.451*** -0.035 -0.876*** -0.804***
IP_EU -0.513*** 0.224 -0.502*** 0.009
Correlation with first principal component in levels
Overall Before During After
VSPOT -0.398*** -0.601*** -0.439** -0.444***
VSLOPE 0.181* 0.536*** 0.267 0.053
VVSTOXX 0.542*** 0.616*** 0.371* 0.702***
VSTOXX50 -0.646*** -0.702*** -0.581*** -0.799***
VIP_EU -0.256*** -0.123 -0.439** -0.121
Correlation with first principal component in changes
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Table 9: Panel A (All 125) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 10: Panel A (All 125) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 329.916*** -404.723*** 1091.989*** -776.508***
LEV 341.221*** 174.567*** 340.597*** 349.963***
VOLA 0.206*** 0.135*** 0.201*** -0.401***
PRICE -1.535*** -0.183*** -1.391*** -0.561
MBV 0.282 -0.026 -89.703*** -11.198***
MV 0.003*** -0.001 0.007*** 0.003***
SPOT -27.462*** -33.699*** -72.907 -43.164***
SLOPE -58.187*** -9.697 -151.949** -21.049**
VSTOXX 3.051*** 2.663*** 3.416*** 3.361***
STOXX50 0.063** 0.043 -0.181 0.098
L_INDEX -0.002** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.009***
IP_EU -3.218*** 4.089*** -5.650* 7.208***
SCS 0.722*** 0.100*** 0.131 0.569***
Observations 13777 5694 2778 5305
Firms 119 116 117 119
Adj. R-squared 0.648 0.739 0.676 0.857
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 1.112** 2.606*** -8.498*** 1.791**
VLEV 81.068*** 4.418 44.460 198.232***
VVOLA 0.144** -0.004 0.232* 0.031
VPRICE -0.691 0.016 -1.303 -0.253
VMBV 0.175 0.008 -37.493** 13.525
VMV 0.002*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
VSPOT -24.806*** -12.783*** -104.893*** -10.121
VSLOPE -27.596*** -6.365*** -115.565*** -3.855
VVSTOXX 0.995*** 0.978*** -0.279 1.358***
VSTOXX50 -0.179*** -0.116*** -0.324*** -0.270***
VL_INDEX -0.005*** 0.001 -0.005* -0.009***
VIP_EU -2.653*** -2.014*** -3.906*** 1.036
VSCS 0.307*** 0.136*** -0.118 0.320***
Observations 13654 5575 2776 5303
Firms 119 116 116 119
Adj. R-squared 0.142 0.110 0.096 0.266
First-differencing model
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Table 11: Panel B (Non-Financials) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 12: Panel B (Non-Financials) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 348.333*** -414.157*** 1270.002*** -322.427*
LEV 554.684*** 247.85*** 635.11*** 568.101***
VOLA 0.332*** 0.132*** 0.275*** -0.122**
PRICE -0.788*** -0.076 -2.202*** 1.256***
MBV -0.106 0.099** -70.788*** -15.875***
MV 0.002*** -0.001 0.009*** -0.001
SPOT -16.127*** -37.561*** -82.271 -16.878***
SLOPE -49.326*** -10.697 -182.563** -6.837
VSTOXX 3.754*** 2.945*** 4.04*** 2.696***
STOXX50 0.088*** 0.069 -0.081 0.103*
L_INDEX -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.01*** -0.008***
IP_EU -4.651*** 4.055*** -8.275** 1.512
SCS 0.416*** 0.084** -0.083 0.436***
Observations 10867 4502 2185 4180
Firms 94 92 92 94
Adj. R-squared 0.620 0.752 0.682 0.809
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.761 2.536*** -10.842*** 1.027
VLEV 166.955*** 9.422 161.713 308.053***
VVOLA 0.185** -0.012 0.272* 0.056
VPRICE -0.850 0.068 -1.724 0.625*
VMBV -0.106 0.023 -25.515 -33.882***
VMV 0.002*** 0.001 0.005** 0.002***
VSPOT -24.331*** -13.957*** -106.149*** -6.69
VSLOPE -28.726*** -7.566*** -114.913*** -10.976**
VVSTOXX 0.921*** 1.156*** -0.428 1.269**
VSTOXX50 -0.134*** -0.115*** -0.289*** -0.168***
VL_INDEX -0.007*** 0.001 -0.009*** -0.008***
VIP_EU -3.628*** -2.128*** -5.625*** -0.544
VSCS 0.321*** 0.148*** -0.264** 0.359***
Observations 10770 4408 2184 4178
Firms 94 92 91 94
Adj. R-squared 0.126 0.111 0.104 0.262
First-differencing model
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Table 13: Panel C (Financials) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 14 Panel C (Financials) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C -120.405 -401.633*** 359.078 -2491.735***
LEV -94.483** -9.523 -13.113 125.854*
VOLA -0.562*** 0.117*** -0.223*** -1.301***
PRICE -0.219 -0.139 0.604* -4.810***
MBV 14.175 -6.740** -136.410*** 10.491
MV 0.005*** -0.001*** 0.004*** 0.008***
SPOT -105.791*** -24.547*** -48.498* -111.724***
SLOPE -98.928*** -9.640 -68.688* -50.766**
VSTOXX 4.830*** 1.693*** 0.326 3.601**
STOXX50 -0.173*** -0.004 -0.479*** -0.373***
L_INDEX 0.002* -0.001*** 0.002* -0.005
IP_EU 5.718*** 4.883*** 3.865* 29.558***
SCS 0.941*** 0.122*** 0.403*** 0.616***
Observations 2910 1192 593 1125
Firms 25 24 25 25
Adj. R-squared 0.791 0.526 0.739 0.898
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 2.814*** 2.765*** -0.193 4.621**
VLEV 20.691* 0.202 -7.552 60.823
VVOLA -0.126** 0.014 -0.093* -0.255
VPRICE -0.262 -0.090 0.173 -0.693
VMBV 31.325*** -5.850* -83.267** 37.293***
VMV -0.001 -7.230 0.003*** 0.001
VSPOT -24.957*** -8.371** -90.626*** -17.755
VSLOPE -23.736*** -2.377 -107.079*** 20.529*
VVSTOXX 1.429*** 0.298* 0.544 2.194***
VSTOXX50 -0.312*** -0.087** -0.281*** -0.592***
VL_INDEX -3.870 0.001 0.002 -0.004
VIP_EU 0.902 -1.493*** 2.983** 5.952**
VSCS 0.296*** 0.096*** 0.387** 0.285***
Observations 2884 1167 592 1125
Firms 25 24 24 25
Adj. R-squared 0.254 0.139 0.209 0.349
First-differencing model
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Table 15 Panel D (CORE) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 16: Panel D (CORE) – First differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 289.148*** -408.951*** 1127.497*** -515.821***
LEV 514.816*** 187.758*** 659.604*** 540.120***
VOLA 0.259*** 0.095** 0.182** -0.013
PRICE -0.647*** -0.096* -1.044*** 1.064***
MBV -10.970*** -3.447 -88.124*** -5.057***
MV 0.002** -0.001 0.008*** -0.002***
SPOT -17.124*** -36.882*** -67.825 -30.811***
SLOPE -43.546*** -12.592 -161.008** -9.998*
VSTOXX 4.474*** 3.024*** 3.259*** 1.261***
STOXX50 0.073*** 0.034 0.026 -0.007
L_INDEX 0.004** 0.001 -0.038*** -0.015***
IP_EU -4.439*** 4.167*** -7.287** 4.959***
SCS 0.191*** 0.129*** -0.095 0.141***
Observations 10166 4215 2041 3910
Firms 88 86 86 88
Adj. R-squared 0.583 0.733 0.673 0.821
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.821 2.821*** -9.496*** 0.874*
VLEV 130.393*** 3.818 146.245 369.045***
VVOLA 0.156** -0.008 0.231* 0.096***
VPRICE -0.566 0.074 -1.322 0.190
VMBV -11.610** -1.418 -30.564 -13.78**
VMV 0.002*** 0.001 0.004** 0.001
VSPOT -25.641*** -14.109*** -110.383*** -18.648***
VSLOPE -25.457*** -7.773*** -123.381*** -9.729**
VVSTOXX 0.260 1.086*** -0.312 0.183
VSTOXX50 -0.138*** -0.089*** -0.265*** -0.141***
VL_INDEX -0.012*** -0.005 -0.015* -0.016***
VIP_EU -3.077*** -2.381*** -4.451*** 0.688
VSCS 0.128*** 0.162*** -0.155 0.091***
Observations 10075 4127 2040 3908
Firms 88 86 85 88
Adj. R-squared 0.092 0.110 0.091 0.235
First-differencing model
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Table 17: Panel E (GIIPS) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 18: Panel E (GIIPS) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 38.142 -332.622*** 831.925*** -2474.038***
LEV 18.774 145.095*** 90.246*** 224.595***
VOLA -1.961*** 0.220* -0.139 0.343
PRICE -3.452*** -0.248* -0.359 -13.452***
MBV 1.025*** 0.055** '-68.200*** -5.781
MV 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.006***
SPOT -84.904*** -27.051*** -91.039* -135.942***
SLOPE -97.850*** -6.471 -143.190** -48.501*
VSTOXX 4.753*** 1.748*** 2.296*** 2.747
STOXX50 -0.296*** 0.033 -0.371*** -0.585***
L_INDEX 0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** 0.010***
IP_EU 4.064** 3.541*** 0.053 29.094***
SCS 0.735*** 0.070*** 0.268*** 0.549***
Observations 3611 1479 737 1395
Firms 31 30 31 31
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.767 0.743 0.853
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 2.211** 2.024*** -5.647** 6.258**
VLEV 46.217*** 5.040 4.558 90.590**
VVOLA 0.064 -0.016 0.121 -0.614
VPRICE -2.417** 0.190 -1.082 -7.503**
VMBV 0.377 0.026* -47.172* 31.001**
VMV 0.002*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.002
VSPOT -22.823*** -9.532** -84.636*** -0.681
VSLOPE -25.826*** -4.789 -90.086*** 28.002***
VVSTOXX 2.030*** 0.745*** -0.334 2.663**
VSTOXX50 -0.346*** -0.088*** -0.281*** -1.027***
VL_INDEX 0.002 0.001 -0.005 0.011***
VIP_EU -0.897 -1.120** -2.160 5.450*
VSCS 0.341*** 0.089*** -0.043 0.337***
Observations 3579 1448 736 1395
Firms 31 30 31 31
Adj. R-squared 0.245 0.123 0.160 0.348
First-differencing model
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Table 19: Panel F (Auto&Industrials) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 20: Panel F (Auto&Industrials) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 463.342*** -363.785** 819.140 -195.769
LEV 517.654*** 215.602*** 1360.935*** 208.133***
VOLA 0.303*** 0.121 0.213** -0.060
PRICE -1.013*** 0.331*** -2.732*** -0.954***
MBV 15.219*** -21.329*** 10.780 7.276*
MV 0.002** -0.001*** 0.012*** 0.002***
SPOT -29.030*** -43.132*** -168.677** -42.462***
SLOPE -61.899*** -7.002 -290.46*** -24.620***
VSTOXX 5.102*** 2.484*** 5.648*** 1.558***
STOXX50 0.131*** 0.129** -0.102 0.159***
L_INDEX -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.032***
IP_EU -5.303*** 4.008** -4.615 4.483***
SCS 0.215*** 0.085** -0.037 0.173***
Observations 4041 1655 816 1570
Firms 36 35 34 36
Adj. R-squared 0.578 0.748 0.564 0.902
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.993 2.756*** -10.242** 1.018
VLEV 127.175*** -7.161 515.250* 154.937***
VVOLA 0.219* -0.055 0.283 0.083*
VPRICE -1.509 0.137 -3.747 -0.412
VMBV 5.299 4.129 44.259 -20.626
VMV 0.003 -0.001 0.009 0.002***
VSPOT -31.561*** -21.711*** -157.317*** -18.102**
VSLOPE -34.114*** -5.220 -177.278*** -17.915***
VVSTOXX -0.016 0.520** -0.595 0.698*
VSTOXX50 -0.152*** -0.118*** -0.376** -0.085*
VL_INDEX -0.016*** -0.003 -0.020** -0.020***
VIP_EU -4.137*** -2.761*** -3.564* 0.025
VSCS 0.193*** 0.159*** -0.155 0.189***
Observations 4004 1620 816 1568
Firms 36 35 34 36
Adj. R-squared 0.103 0.081 0.107 0.337
First-differencing model
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Table 21: Panel G (Consumer) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 22: Panel G (Consumer) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 192.471* -413.464*** 1812.396*** -993.456***
LEV 795.288*** 314.552*** 427.664** 819.571***
VOLA 0.242 0.070 1.204*** -0.044
PRICE -4.971*** -1.387* -8.139*** 3.218***
MBV 44.916*** 10.531 -93.595*** 9.607
MV 0.011*** 0.002 0.033*** -0.003**
SPOT -20.350*** -49.342*** 49.945 -20.872***
SLOPE -26.752*** -11.202 -34.118 15.420
VSTOXX 6.012*** 4.396*** 1.106 2.092***
STOXX50 0.179*** 0.075 -0.084 -0.117*
L_INDEX 0.005 0.007*** -0.023*** -0.024***
IP_EU -5.995*** 3.600** -16.326*** 9.424***
SCS 0.216*** 0.132*** -0.046 -0.257***
Observations 1883 779 384 720
Firms 16 16 16 16
Adj. R-squared 0.736 0.828 0.846 0.883
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.908 2.872*** -12.329*** 0.629
VLEV 296.604*** 63.002 409.462* 538.124***
VVOLA 0.166* -0.090 0.524** 0.063
VPRICE -2.784*** -1.740 -4.716* -2.484**
VMBV -11.473* -4.860 -25.329 1.455
VMV 0.009*** 0.006** 0.015*** 0.008***
VSPOT -25.431** -15.667 -60.446* -26.028
VSLOPE -20.941* -12.811 -48.652 -11.183
VVSTOXX 0.368 2.193*** -1.903 0.324
VSTOXX50 -0.119* -0.065 -0.274* -0.110
VL_INDEX -0.017** -0.008 -0.015 -0.023
VIP_EU -3.222*** -2.040*** -7.339*** 1.622
VSCS 0.107*** 0.147*** -0.228 0.078*
Observations 1866 762 384 720
Firms 16 16 16 16
Adj. R-squared 0.164 0.177 0.190 0.195
First-differencing model
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Table 23: Panel H (Energy) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 24: Panel H (Energy) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C -16.914 -339.160*** 1039.691*** -425.868*
LEV 238.140*** 42.568*** 122.606*** 393.507***
VOLA 0.024 0.062*** 0.366*** -0.475*
PRICE 0.257*** -0.085* 1.566*** 2.827***
MBV 0.007 -0.092*** -12.851 -91.722***
MV 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001
SPOT -17.852*** -21.575*** -97.089** 4.667
SLOPE -35.286*** -0.621 -170.009*** 4.875
VSTOXX 2.365*** 1.521*** 3.561*** 1.966**
STOXX50 -0.032* 0.007 -0.037 0.021
L_INDEX -0.001 -0.001*** -0.005*** -0.004**
IP_EU 0.102 3.566*** -5.949* 3.069
SCS 0.345*** 0.074*** -0.098 0.340***
Observations 1915 811 384 720
Firms 16 16 16 16
Adj. R-squared 0.710 0.712 0.575 0.780
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.449 1.638*** -6.656*** 1.621
VLEV 80.696* 3.404 74.142 108.13
VVOLA 0.141*** -0.002 0.449*** 0.129
VPRICE 0.261 0.139 0.909 3.456***
VMBV 0.035 0.009 -17.909 -77.636**
VMV 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.002*
VSPOT -14.214*** -5.642*** -80.509*** 14.341**
VSLOPE -21.106*** 2.026 -110.334*** 4.431
VVSTOXX 0.936*** 0.574*** 0.921* 0.769
VSTOXX50 -0.069* -0.048** -0.075 -0.279***
VL_INDEX -0.003* 0.002** -0.003 -0.003*
VIP_EU -2.710*** -1.016*** -6.941*** -0.674
VSCS 0.209*** 0.128*** -0.382*** 0.294***
Observations 1899 795 384 720
Firms 16 16 16 16
Adj. R-squared 0.156 0.280 0.191 0.295
First-differencing model
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Table 25: Panel I (Financial Services) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 26: Panel I (Financial Services) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 506.508*** -375.167** 1376.31*** -102.227
LEV 187.108*** 140.655*** 35.005 167.227***
VOLA 1.083*** 0.481*** 0.378 0.283***
PRICE -1.940*** 0.820*** -7.159*** 0.939***
MBV -71.710*** -72.742*** -148.62*** -64.643***
MV 0.004*** 0.001 0.015*** -0.001
SPOT -17.456*** -40.38*** -128.217* -14.138***
SLOPE -41.288*** -2.340 -216.741** -6.714
VSTOXX 2.094*** 2.543*** 4.209** 1.005
STOXX50 0.034 0.075 -0.033 -0.040
L_INDEX 0.003*** -0.001** 0.005 -0.008***
IP_EU -3.951*** 4.123*** -5.960 2.739
SCS 0.334*** 0.130*** 0.568** 0.236***
Observations 964 412 192 360
Firms 8 8 8 8
Adj. R-squared 0.610 0.642 0.757 0.850
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.840 2.227** -6.275 1.203
VLEV -45.183 18.473 -91.612* 11.274
VVOLA 0.094 0.147*** 0.189 0.134*
VPRICE -0.037 -0.051 -0.022 0.409
VMBV 5.359 13.949 50.395 -110.188***
VMV -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 0.001
VSPOT -16.974* -13.96** -116.953** 0.078
VSLOPE -27.276** -21.415*** -164.558** 7.410
VVSTOXX 0.826 2.100*** 1.363 0.142
VSTOXX50 -0.176*** -0.094* -0.242* -0.286***
VL_INDEX -0.001 0.003* 0.002 -0.004
VIP_EU -3.585 -2.441** -6.990 2.463**
VSCS 0.215*** 0.184*** 0.026 0.128***
Observations 956 404 192 360
Firms 8 8 8 8
Adj. R-squared 0.126 0.209 0.080 0.441
First-differencing model
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Table 27: Panel J (TMT) – Firm fixed effects model 
 
Table 28: Panel J (TMT) – First-differencing model 
 
Overall Before During After
C 170.752 -228.334 1178.548 -1230.614
LEV 1029.159*** 276.604 722.467*** 1380.126***
VOLA -1.678*** 0.060*** -2.389*** -1.204***
PRICE 3.322*** -0.965 -1.301** 8.957***
MBV -27.430*** 8.116* -206.128 5.544***
MV 0.001 -0.002*** 0.014*** 0.002
SPOT -9.867** -32.809*** -80.616*** -68.274*
SLOPE -69.631*** -27.261*** -184.767* -21.968***
VSTOXX 2.515*** 4.014* 5.548*** 1.494
STOXX50 0.045 0.028*** 0.257*** -0.115
L_INDEX -0.003*** -0.002 -0.017 -0.005
IP_EU -2.999** 2.691*** -7.156*** 8.385
SCS 0.509*** 0.112 -0.219** 0.451**
Observations 2064 845 409 810
Firms 18 17 18 18
Adj. R-squared 0.686 0.742 0.799 0.774
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
C 0.697 2.942*** -14.551*** 2.768
VLEV 528.320** 23.752 322.799 1393.724***
VVOLA 0.122 0.030 0.369 -0.114
VPRICE 4.707*** 0.246 4.145 9.254***
VMBV -16.536** -1.878 -54.087 -8.537
VMV 0.002 0.001 0.005** 0.003
VSPOT -22.966** -6.986 -79.723** 5.231
VSLOPE -27.974*** -13.133 -64.047 -6.500
VVSTOXX 2.388*** 1.662*** -0.514 2.656*
VSTOXX50 -0.099 -0.132** -0.283** -0.207
VL_INDEX -0.004 -0.003 -0.010* 0.002
VIP_EU -3.390** -2.097*** -6.647*** -3.379
VSCS 0.390** 0.133** -0.552** 0.389**
Observations 2045 827 408 810
Firms 18 17 17 18
Adj. R-squared 0.217 0.141 0.143 0.321
First-differencing model
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Table 29: Country heterogeneity in sovereign-to-corporate credit risk spillover 
The following tables show the effects of a one unit change in sovereign CDS spread 
(SCS) on the corporate CDS spreads for the companies headquartered in the respective 
sovereign. The effect is measured in levels using a firm fixed effects model (a) and for 
changes using a first-differencing model (b). All explanatory variables from Table 9-28 
are included in the multivariate regression but not reported, except SCS and VSCS. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The time period 
is split into three sub-periods. Before is defined from January 2004 to April 2008, during 
from May 2008 to April 2010, after from May 2010 to April 2014 and overall from 
January 2004 to April 2014. 
 
 
Overall Before During After
Core:
France 0.264*** 0.111** 0.080 0.096*
Germany 0.239** 0.283*** 0.747* 0.108
Netherlands 0.055** 0.015 0.098 -0.012
Finland 0.374*** 0.249** -0.225* 0.237*
Belgium 0.187*** 0.012 0.195 -0.065
Austria 0.368*** 0.126** 1.035*** 0.190**
PIIGS:
Italy 0.438*** 0.098** 0.259 0.495***
Spain 0.344*** 0.031 -0.201 0.307**
Portugal 1.268*** 0.079** 0.283* 1.416***
Greece 0.005*** -0.000 0.005** 0.002***
Ireland 0.311** 0.405*** 0.043 0.420*
Firm fixed effects model
Overall Before During After
Core:
France 0.083** 0.184*** -0.360** 0.068**
Germany 0.271*** 0.196*** 0.178 0.086**
Netherlands 0.088*** 0.084* -0.040 0.067**
Finland 0.142** 0.312** -0.321** 0.250**
Belgium 0.081** -0.006 0.110 0.058
Austria 0.322*** 0.140* 0.979* 0.158***
Italy 0.456*** 0.140** -0.249 0.712***
Spain 0.312*** 0.048* -0.142 0.348***
Portugal 0.711*** 0.067 0.323* 0.530**
Greece 0.003*** 0.000* 0.000 0.002***
Ireland 0.287 0.534** 0.279 0.193
First-differencing model
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Table 30: Granger-Causality Test 
This table shows the summary statistics of the Granger causality test using three lags 
representing three months. In order to do so, the causality of each company with its 
respective sovereign is tested. Out of the 125 bivariate Granger causality tests the 
average and median p-value is calculated as well as the number of pairs for which the 
causality using three lags is significant at the 5% level. The results are presented for 
Panel A-E and for the time during and after the global financial crisis. 
 
 
Granger causality: During period from M ay 2008  to  April 2010
Average                  
p-value
Median                     
p-value
Rejection of null 
hypothesis at 
5% level # Firms
Share of 
firms below 
5% level
Null hypothesis: Corporate CDS does not Granger Cause Sovereign CDS
Panel A: All 125 0.262 0.110 38 125 30.4%
Panel B: Non-Financial 0.250 0.088 35 100 35.0%
Panel C: Financial 0.306 0.265 3 25 12.0%
Panel D: Core 0.249 0.088 34 94 36.2%
Panel E: GIIPS 0.299 0.176 4 31 12.9%
Null hypotheis; Sovereign CDS does not Granger Cause Corporate CDS
Panel A: All 125 0.282 0.176 25 125 20.0%
Panel B: Non-Financial 0.304 0.214 18 100 18.0%
Panel C: Financial 0.196 0.124 7 25 28.0%
Panel D: Core 0.309 0.217 13 94 13.8%
Panel E: GIIPS 0.202 0.081 12 31 38.7%
Granger causality: After period from M ay 2010  to  April 2014
Average                  
p-value
Median                     
p-value
Rejection of null 
hypothesis at 
5% level # Firms
Share of 
firms below 
5% level
Null hypothesis: Corporate CDS does not Granger Cause Sovereign CDS
Panel A: All 125 0.318 0.227 21 125 16.8%
Panel B: Non-Financial 0.318 0.227 16 100 16.0%
Panel C: Financial 0.319 0.288 5 25 20.0%
Panel D: Core 0.302 0.222 17 94 18.1%
Panel E: GIIPS 0.365 0.337 4 31 12.9%
Null hypotheis; Sovereign CDS does not Granger Cause Corporate CDS
Panel A: All 125 0.203 0.102 46 125 36.8%
Panel B: Non-Financial 0.214 0.099 38 100 38.0%
Panel C: Financial 0.162 0.125 8 25 32.0%
Panel D: Core 0.228 0.117 30 94 31.9%
Panel E: GIIPS 0.129 0.028 16 31 51.6%
 Figure 1: CDS iTraxx Europe Index
The CDS iTraxx Europe Index is a credit default swap index using the most 125 liquid 
CDS contracts (financial and non
market development. The CDS iTraxx Europe Crossover Index uses only non
investment grade CDS contra
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-financial) in Europe to represent the overall credit 
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 Figure 2: Sovereign and Corporate CDS spread in the 
The dashed blue line represents the 
the 5-year median CDS spread computed across non
headquartered in a country.
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